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In a contest group - specific public goods we consider the effect that managing an 
interest group has on the rent dissipation and the total expected payoffs of the contest. 
While in the first group, there is a central planner determining its members’ 
expenditure in the contest, in the second group there are two different possibilities: 
either all the members are governed by a central planner or they aren’t. We consider 
both types of contests: an all pay auction and a Logit contest success function. We 
show that while governing an interest group decreases free-riding, it may as well 
decrease the rent dissipation; at the same time the expected payoffs from the groups 
may also decrease. 
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1. Introduction 
Government intervention often gives rise to contests in which the possible prizes are 
determined by the status-quo and some new public-policy proposals. Since a proposed 
policy reform has different implications for different interest groups, the groups make 
every effort to influence the approval of the proposed public policy makers in their 
favor. A major concern in the contest literature has been the issue of how changes in 
the parameters of the contest (number of the players, valuations and abilities of the 
contestants and the nature of the information they have) alter the equilibrium efforts 
and the extent of relative prize dissipation: see Hillman and Riley  (1989), Hurley and 
Shogren (1998), Konrad (2002), Nitzan (1994) and Nti (1997). In addition, attention 
is paid to the effect of the changes made in these parameters on the contestants’ 
expected payoffs, as in Gradstein (1995) and Nti (1997). Moreover, a major 
theoretical effort has been made to clarify the different levels of rent under-dissipation 
in the contests, Gradstein and Konrad (1999), Kahana and Nitzan (1999), Konrad 
(2004), Konrad and Schlesinger (1997), Nitzan (1994), Nti (1997). However Epstein, 
Nitzan and Schwarz (2009) show that while contestants usually expend resources in 
trying to win the contested prize, potential recipients of the rent-seeking efforts also 
participate in the contest. This is due to an uncertainty regarding the source of power 
in the contest as a result of which rent dissipation may well increase.  
In this paper the case of a two interest group is considered. We compare two 
situations. In the first, one group is governed by a central planner and the other isn't, 
and in the second, both groups are governed by central planners. Our objective is to 
compare the rent dissipation and the payoffs in the two different contests. For 
example, consider the case of a firm that is defending its dominant power over 
consumers who are challenging it: Baik (1999), Ellingsen (1991), Epstein and Nitzan 
(2003, 2007) and Schmidt (1992). In the first case, the firm is one entity, while the 
consumers may or may not be organized. We examine the effect of consumers who 
are organized as one group, and governed by a central planner comparing them to a 
situation where the consumers are not organized. It is clear that the consumers, while 
organized, will decrease the free-riding which would occur without a central planner; 
however, it is not clear how organizing the consumers under a central planner will 
affect the firm’s efforts in the contest.  One could think of many other situations in 
which this could occur, such as the struggle over the determination for minimum   3
wages, migration quotas etc. This comparison is carried out considering two different 
contest success functions: 1. The generalized logit function; 2. The All Pay Auction. 
Riaz, Shogren and Johnson (1995) deal with a general model of rent seeking 
for the public good. In the paper they demonstrate that total effort expended in a 
collective rent-seeking contest depends on the group size. Moreover, they show that 
rent seeking increases as the group size increases. In our paper we take a different 
approach. Considering the situation of a given group's size, the question we wish to 
analyze is whether letting a group to be governed by a central planner will increase or 
decrease total expenditure in the contests, and what will be the effect on a total 
expected payoff.  
Although the results we obtain for both types of contest success functions are 
quite similar, they do not always coincide. Under the generalized Logit contest 
success function, when a group becomes organized, its expenditure increases, but it is 
not clear what will happen to its expected payoff.  On the other hand, the opponents 
expected payoff decreases while it is not clear what will happen to its expenditure in 
the contest. Surprisingly, when a group becomes organized, it may well be that both 
the rent dissipation in the contest and the total expected payoff will increase.  
Under the all pay auction contest success function, when a group becomes 
organized, its expenditure does not decrease, yet it is not clear what happens to its 
expected payoff. The opponents expected payoff will not increase, while it is not clear 
what will happen to its expenditure. As in the results obtained in the logit contest 
success function, there are situations under which both the rent dissipation and the 
total expected payoffs increase (even though the conditions are not identical to those 
of the logit function). This emphasizes the result presented by Hurley (1998) who has 
shown that rent dissipation can be a misleading measure of the welfare implications of 
a contest when players have asymmetric valuations. The results obtained depend on 
deciding which of the interest groups is the favorite, and which is the underdog. This 
issue will be further elaborated on below.  
In addition, we show that the rent dissipation may decrease in such a situation. 
The intuition for the decrease in the rent dissipation is that if the parties are 
strategically symmetric in the absence of coordinated action inside the group which 
constitutes one party, coordination inside the group makes this group much stronger, 
and so generates the asymmetry which reduces the amount of the overall rent seeking 
in the contest    4
Examples of such situations would be the struggle over a monopoly when 
there are a large number of consumers, each with a low benefit from winning the 
contest or workers who are struggling for an increase in minimum wages. We show 
that under the logit contest success function governing this group will increase the 
probability of the group winning the contest, and at the same time decrease the rent 
dissipation and the effect on the total expected payoffs, which may also increase as a 
result. This, in turn, will increase welfare.  
 
2. The Model 
Consider a contest with two groups competing for a prize. As in Epstein and Nitzan 
(2007), suppose that a status-quo policy is challenged by one interest group, and 
defended by the other. This policy can be the price of a regulated monopoly, the 
maximal degree of pollution the government allows, the existing tax structure, the 
determination of the minimum wage, etc. The defender of the status-quo policy 
(henceforth, the defending interest group) prefers the status-quo policy to any 
alternative policy. The challenger of the status-quo policy (the challenging group) 
prefers the alternative strategy. For example, in the contest over monopoly regulations 
studied in Baik (1999), Ellingsen (1991), Epstein and Nitzan (2003, 2007) and 
Schmidt (1992), the firm with the monopoly defends the status-quo by lobbying for 
the profit-maximizing monopoly price (and against any price regulation), while 
consumers challenge the status-quo lobbying effort, preferring a competitive price.  In 
a different example, the defending group would be the employers endorsing the 
status-quo against the worker's union that wants to change the minimum wage 
(Epstein and Nitzan, 2006b, 2007). In the challenging group (the consumers and the 
employees), there are N players, and in the defending group there is one player (the 
monopoly, the capital owners). In the challenging group each player receives a benefit 
of n from winning the contest, and the defender (the monopoly) receives a benefit of 
m .  Player  i   N i ,..., 1   invests  i x resources to change the status-quo, and the 
defending player invests y units in the contest.  
We consider two types of contests: 1. The generalized logit function; 2. The 
All Pay Auction. We start by considering the case of the generalized logit contest 
success function, and then analyze the situation under the all pay auction contest 
success function.    5
 
2.1 The Generalized Logit Contest Success Function   
2.1.1 An unorganized group  
The probability that the new policy will be accepted and the status-quo changed,  N Pr , 
is given by the generalized logit contest success function as  (Tullock, 1980):  
 















1 Pr  with  1 0       . (1) 
 
We restrict our analysis to the case where  1 0    (see Epstein and Mealem, 2009). 
The expected payoff of each of the players in the challenging group equals: 
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and the expected payoff  of the defining group equals: 
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  Defining the ratio of the stakes between the challenging group’s stake and the 
defender's stake by k: 
m
n
k  .  Solving the first order conditions for each of the 
players in the different groups (it can be verified that the second order conditions 
hold), we obtain that the investments in equilibrium, ( i x  and y) and the probability of 
the challenging group winning the contest equal: 
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The expected payoffs of the players equal: 
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Using (4) we can calculate the rent dissipation (RD) in the contest and obtain: 
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and the total expected payoffs of the players equal: 
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2.1.2 The challenging group is governed by a central planner 
Assume that the challenging group is governed by a central planner who determines 
the investment of each of the players in the group. The expected payoff of the 
challenging group becomes:  
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while expected payoff of the defending group is defined by (3).   7
Solving the first order conditions for each player in the different groups (the 
second order conditions hold) we obtain that the investments in equilibrium, ( i x  and 
y) and the probability of the challenging group winning the contest equal:    
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The expected payoffs of the players equal: 
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Using (9) the rent dissipation (RD) in the contest equals:   
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and the total expected payoffs of the players equal: 
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2.1.3 Comparing the two situations  
In this section we wish to compare the two cases. In the first, each of the players in 
the challenging group invests optimally in the contests and in the other, while the 
challenging group is governed by a central planner who determines the amount that 
each player invests.    8
Let us start by considering the total investment made by the challenging 
group. We wish to see if a central planner will increase or decrease the investment of 
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* * ,  and increases the probability of winning 
* * * Pr Pr N N  . 
 
The lemma states that a central planner will increase the total investment of the group 
relative to the same investment, if the group is not organized by the planner. The main 
idea behind this result states that the central planner can decrease free-riding, and thus 
increase the total investment of the groups.   
  Following Dixit (1987) and Riaz, Shorgren and Johnson (1995) define the 
contest “favorite” and “underdog”. The favorite is the group whose probability of 
winning at Nash equilibrium exceeds one-half whereas its rival is the underdog.    
If the challenging group is not organized, it is the favorite if and only if 
1
1 
  k N . If there is a central planner, it is favorite if and only if  1 
 Nk . In both 
cases a sufficient condition for the challenging group to be a favorite is  1  k . This is 
not surprising since when  1  k  the value of each of the players in the challenging 
group is higher than in the other group as well as the fact that number of players is 
also larger and thus we obtain that this group is the favorite.  We will return to this 
later on in the paper.  
Consider the investment made by the defending group. The defending group 
will invest less than would have been invested if the challenging group had not been 
governed by a central planner if 
* * * y y  . From (9) and (4) 
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k N  thus, 
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Proposition 1: The defending group will decrease its efforts as a result of the central 
planner governing the challenging group, 
* * * y y  ,  




k N .  
2.  A sufficient condition would be that the stake of a member of the 
challenging group will be at least as large as the stake of the defending 
group:  m n   ( 1  k ).  
  
Proposition 1  states that it is not clear if the defending group invests more or less 
when the challenging group is organized. Once the challenging group increases its 
investment by becoming organized, the defending group may increase or decrease its 
investment.
2 The condition which must hold depends on the ratio of the stakes and the 




k N , then the defending group 
will decrease its investment when the challenging group becomes organized. Thus, 
the idea here would be that as the challenging group increases the total investment, it 
forces the defending group to decrease its expenditure.  In the second part of the 
proposition, a sufficient condition is given to ensure the decrease of the defending 
group’s investment. This condition states that if the stake of a member of the 
challenging group is at least as large as that of the defending group's stake, then the 
defending group will decrease its investment. This means that the challenging group, 
as a group, has a lot more to gain from the contests. The organized group will increase 
its investment and force the defending group to decrease theirs. Moreover, the 
sufficient condition in the second part of the proposition, 1  k , is identical to stating 
that the organized group is the favorite. In other words, if the challenging group is the 
favorite, then becoming organized increases this group's efforts (lemma 1) making the 
group even stronger, and forcing the defending group to decrease its effort in the 
contests. 
 
Rent Dissipation (RD) and Expected Payoffs 
As we have seen, organizing the challenging group will increase its investment while 
it may or may not increase the defending group's investment. The question, which is 
                                                  
2 This result is somewhat similar to the result presented in Epstein and Nitzan (2006a) where they 
present a case in which increasing the stake of one party sufficiently may increase that group's 
investment, and cause the other group to decrease its investment.     10
now posed, is what happens to the total investment and to the expected payoffs of 
both groups. In other words, what happens to the rent dissipation of the contest and to 
the expected payoffs as a result of the challenging group becoming organized?  
  We would, therefore, like to see if a situation exists under which the total 
investment in the contest decreases. The rent dissipation is seen many times as 
wasteful resources invested in the contest. Decreasing the wasteful resources can 
often be an indicator for welfare enhancing. This would mean that the increase in the 
investment of the challenging group would be smaller than the decrease in the 
defending group's investment. Note that Hurley (1998) mentions that rent dissipation 
can be a misleading measure of the welfare implications of a contest when players 
have asymmetric valuations. Thus, we will also consider how the sum of expected 
payoffs for all the players compares with and without a central decision maker for the 
challenging group. 
When the challenging group is unorganized, the RD of the contest will be 
higher than when the challenging group is organized, (
* * * RD RD  )  if 









* * * * y Nx
m n N
m n m n N
m Nn
m Nn m Nn












   
.  Substituting 
m
n
























       
     1 1
1 2 1 0
2 2 1
1 1 1 2 2 1
    
   

    
    
    
N N N k N kN
N N k N N k
                        (13) 
 
Define the RHS of (13) by G:  
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Condition (13) may hold. For example, if  7 . 0   ,  000 , 20  N  and  003 . 0  k , then 
0  G  (
* * * RD RD  ). 
G consists of 4 components. The first three components are all negative. Thus, 
in order for the total summation to be positive, the last component must be positive. 
This will be true if  0
2 2  




k N . This is, therefore, a   11
necessary but not a sufficient condition for (11) to hold, and not surprisingly, the 
necessary and the sufficient condition for 
* * * y y   (notice that according to lemma 1 








* * ; therefore, for 
* * * RD RD   it must be the case 
that 
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Proposition 2:   
A.  Rent dissipation 
As a result of the challenging group becoming organized, the rent dissipation of the 
contest will: 
1.  increase if the stake of a member of the challenging group is at least as large 
as that of the defending group ( 1  k ). 
2.  decrease if the stake of a member of the challenging group is sufficiently 
small, while the number of players in this group is sufficiently large.  
B. Total expected payoffs   
As a result of the challenging group becoming organized, the total expected payoffs of 
the players will: 
1.  increase if the stake of a member of the challenging group is high enough. 
2.  decrease if the stake of a member of the challenging group is sufficiently 







C. Expected payoffs of each group   
As the challenging group becomes organized: 
1.  the expected payoffs of the defending group will decrease. 
2.  the expected payoffs of the challenging group will decrease if k is small 
enough and  1   , and will increase if k is high enough.  
 
For proof of proposition 2 see Appendix 1. 
 
Proposition 2 part A1 states that if the challenging group is the favorite (this occurs 
when the stake of a member of the challenging group is larger than that of the 
defending group), then as a result of the challenging group's organizing, the rent 
dissipation of the contest will increase. This result is independent of the number of   12
players in the challenging group, and depends only on the size of the stake of a 
single player in the group. In other words, this means that in the case of ( 1  k ), and 
as a result of the challenging group becoming organized, even though the defending 
group will decrease its effort, 
* * * y y   (proposition 1) the challenging group will 
increase its effort. Moreover, if the stake of a member of the challenging group is high 
enough (which makes the challenging group the favorite) the results of proposition 2 
part A1 and B1 will be that the rent dissipation, and the expected payoffs of the 
contest will increase. The idea behind this result is that if the stakes are sufficiently 
high, and the asymmetry between the contestants is also high, the favorite group will 
have a bigger advantage over its opponent, the underdog. 
Proposition 2 part A2 and B2 state that the rent dissipation and expected 
payoffs may decrease. This occurs when the challenging group is the underdog. Thus, 
when the challenging group becomes organized, it increases its expenditure, but with 
the decrease in expenditure of the defending group, the total investment in the contest 
will decrease. The intuition for this result is that, if the two parties are strategically 
symmetric, in the absence of coordinated action inside the challenging group, 
coordination inside the other group will make it much stronger, and this will generate 
the asymmetry, which reduces the amount of overall rent-seeking in the equilibrium. 
In this situation, we would have many players in the challenging group, (the 
underdog), all having low benefits from winning the contest. This means that when 
they become organized, the total investment of the group increases causing the 
defending group to decrease its expenditure resulting in lower rent dissipation. Note 
that in such a situation, the probability of the challenging group winning the contest 
will increase. In the case of the monopoly story, by organizing the consumers, the 
probability of their winning increases because of the lower cost to society, and due to 
the decrease in the total expenditure.  
Note that when the challenging group becomes organized, the expected payoff 
of the defending group decreases; however, the challenging group's expected payoff 
may decrease too. This is because when the challenging group becomes organized the 
defending group changes its strategy, and even though the challenging group replies 
optimally, its payoff could be decreased. 
As we have seen from proposition 2 part A1, if k is sufficiently high (and 
therefore the challenging group is the favorite), becoming organized increases the   13
total rent dissipation in the contest. However, at the same time the challenging 
group’s expected payoff increases, (proposition 2 part C2) and the expected payoff of 
the defending group decreases (this is always true according to proposition 2 part C1) 
in such a way that the total expected payoff increases (proposition 2 part B1). A high 
k increases the asymmetry between the contestants, and increases the advantage the 
favorite group has.  This coincides with the findings of Hurley (1998) who has shown 
that rent dissipation can be a misleading measure of the welfare implications of a 
contest, when the players have asymmetric valuations. In our situation both the rent 
dissipation and the total expected payoffs increase. In this case, total expected payoffs 
would be a better indicator for welfare affects. 
 
2.2 The All-Pay Auction Contest Success Function 
The all-pay auction contest success function is given by: 
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At equilibrium, the only active player in the challenging group is the one whose 
valuation for the prize is the highest and all the other players expend zero effort (see 
Baik, Kim, and Na, 2001). Since all the players in the challenging group have the 
same valuation, in equilibrium only one of the players in the group is active.  We will 
now compare the situation of an unorganized group to the case of an organized group 














2.2.1 An un-organized group  
 
1. If  1  k  ( m n  ): 
If the group is not organized, then: 
                                                  
3 The results presented use the standard techniques as presented by Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 
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1  k , the challenging group is the favorite ( 5 . 0 Pr
*  N ). Assuming that player 1 is the 
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2. If  1  k  ( m n  ): 
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challenging group is the underdog ( 5 . 0 Pr
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player in the challenging group, the expected payoffs of the players equal    0
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  ( m nN  ): 
 
If there is a central planner in the challenging group, the total value of the challenging 
group is nN . Since  m nN   therefore: 
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 , the challenging group is the favorite ( 5 . 0 Pr
* *  N ). If the central planner 
divides the total expenditure equally among the players in the challenging group, then 
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If there is a central planner in the challenging group, the total value of the challenging 
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the challenging group is the underdog ( 5 . 0 Pr
* *  N ). If the central planner divides the 
total expenditure equally among the players in the challenging group, then the 
expected payoffs of the players equal    0
* *  i U E  for  N i ,..., 1   and 
  nN m U E d  
* * . 
 
2.2.3 Comparing the two situations  
Let us compare the rent dissipation in both cases.  
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d d U E nN m n m U E      . 
Therefore 
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quite surprising since when the challenging group becomes organized, the rent 
dissipation increases and the expected payoff of each player decreases, except for the 
active player in the challenging group, whose payoff has not changed.  
The logic behind these results is the following: When the challenging group is 
not organized it has a lower value and the "symmetry" of the contest (hereafter "the 
first contest") depends on the "gap" between the two values, n and m. Given m (n) the 
higher (lower) n (m) the contest is more “symmetric,” and as a result, the expenditure 
of both groups increases. Now let us see what would happen to the “symmetry” of the 
contest when the challenging group becomes organized. In this case the challenging 
group has a higher value but still less than m ( m nN  ). Since the "gap" between the 
two values decreases, (moving from  m n   to  m nN  ) the contest becomes more 
“symmetric” in comparison to the first contest, which results in a rise of the total 
investment, and a reduction in the expected payoff. 
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* * * 0 d d U E n m U E     . In this case the rest of the results depend on the 
relationship between k and N, while in the former cases the obtained results are 
independent of that relationship. When the challenging group becomes organized, the 
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 k . Combining the above two sufficient conditions we conclude that 
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Proposition 3:   
A. Rent dissipation 
Under an all-pay auction, as a result of the challenging group becoming organized, the 
rent dissipation of the contest will:  
1.  decrease if the stake of a member of the challenging group is at least as large 
as that of the defending group ( 1  k ).     18















B. Total expected payoffs   
Once challenging group has become organized, the total expected payoffs will 
increase if and only if  k k  , where  1
1











C. Expected payoffs of each group   
As the challenging group becomes organized: 
1.  the expected payoffs of the defending group will not increase. 
2.  the expected payoffs of the challenging group will increase if and only if 














For proof of proposition 3 see Appendix 2. 
 
Let us explain the economic intuition behind the results of Proposition 3 part A. 
When the challenging group is not organized, the contest is between one player in the 
challenging group, and the player in the defending group (the free ride is complete). 
When there is a central planner in the challenging group, we can treat the challenging 
group as one player with a (total) value of nN . Therefore, in both cases, the contest is 
between one player in the challenging group, and the (one) another player in the 
defending group. Therefore, we have to consider only the relationship between the 
valuations of two players: When the challenging group is not organized n and m, and 
when it is organized nN  and m.  
Notice that when the valuations of the two players become more identical the 
contest is more “symmetric”. Therefore: 




  - case 1 and 2.2.2). In 
these cases when the challenging group becomes organized, the value of the 
(player who represents the) challenging group increases to nN . Therefore, the 
contest is less “symmetric” resulting in a reduction of the expenditure of the 
defending group; therefore, the total investment in the contest will decrease.   19




  - case 2 in 2.2.2) then  m n   ( 1  k  - case 2 in 2.2.1). In 
these cases when the challenging group becomes organized, the value of the 
two players become more identical, and the contest is more “symmetric” 
resulting in a rise of the expenditure of both groups; therefore, the total 
investment in the contest will increase. 




 - case 2 in 2.2.1 and case 1 in 2.2.2 ), and the 
challenging group becomes organized, then the value of the two players 
becomes more/less identical and the contest is more/less “symmetric”. As a 
result, the expenditure of the challenging group increases, while the effect on 
the expenditure of the defending group is ambiguous. Let us now explain in 
which cases the total investment decreases, and in which it increases when the 
challenging group becomes organized. When the challenging group is not 
organized, it has a lower value ( m n  ) and the "symmetry" of the contest 
depends on the "gap" between the two values, n and m: as long as  m n  , 
given m (n) the higher (lower) is n (m) the contest is more “symmetric”. As a 
result, the expenditure of both group increases. Now let us see what would 
happen to the "symmetry" of the contest when the challenging group becomes 
organized in comparison to the first contest. In this case, the challenging group 
has a higher value ( nN m  ) and as the "symmetry" of the contest decreases, 
the "gap" becomes between the two values is widened (m and nN ). For low 
values of N the "gap" between the two (m and nN ) is low, and therefore the 
contest could be more “symmetric” compared to the first one resulting in a rise 
of the total investment. If, on the other hand, N is high, the contest is less 
“symmetric” in comparison to the first one, which results in a reduction of the 
total investment 
 


















 (for example, this would be satisfied if 
25 . 0  k  and  10  N ) and the challenging group becomes organized (the challenging 
group moves from being an underdog to being a favorite), the rent dissipation of the 
contest increases. However, at the same time the challenging group’s expected payoff   20
increases,
4 and the expected payoff of the defending group decreases in such a way 
that the total expected payoffs increase. Thus, the transformation from an underdog to 
a favorite in the contests has an important impact on the expected payoffs of the 
contestants and the rent dissipation. 
 As we have mentioned in the discussion on the Logit contest success function 
this coincides with the findings of Hurley (1998) who stressed that total expected 
payoffs would be a better indicator for welfare effects.  
 
3. Concluding remarks 
Government intervention often gives rise to contests in which the possible prizes are 
determined by the status-quo and some new public-policy proposal. Since a proposed 
policy reform has different implications for different interest groups, these groups 
make every effort to affect the probability of the approval of the proposed public 
policy, in their favor. What determines the contestants’ efforts to the proposed policy 
reform, and, in turn, the change in their probability of winning the contest, are the 
stakes and the structure of the interest groups.  
We consider two types of contest success function: 1. The generalized logit 
function; 2. The All Pay Auction. We have shown that, if an interest group is 
governed by a central planner, the rent dissipation of the contest may decrease, and 
the total expected payoffs increase. On the other hand, it may well be that both the 
rent dissipation and total expected payoffs increase. In general, we see that the answer 
to whether the rent dissipation increases or decreases, and its affect on total expected 
payoffs depend in some sense on who is considered the underdog and who is the 
favorite. The results we obtained under the all pay auction and the generalized logits 
contest success functions are not always identical. More specifically, when the stake 
ration between the two groups (k) is larger or equal to one, then under the generalized 
logit function the rent dissipation increases, while under the all pay auction the rent 
dissipation decreases.  
In the case of the monopoly story, it is a well-known fact that a regulated 
monopoly is welfare enhancing, and thus the consumers who wish to regulate the 
monopoly, also wish to increase social welfare. We have shown that if the ratio of the 
                                                  
4 It is always true that  k k  ; therefore, if  k k  , then  k k  , so the expected payoffs of the 
challenging group will increase.   21
stakes between the consumer and the firm are sufficiently high, the consumers will 
benefit from being governed by a central planner. However, if this ration is not 
sufficiently high, we may obtain contradicting results for both types of contest success 
functions.  
Even though the probability of the consumers' winning and their expected 
payoff increases, there may well be an extra benefit: a reduction in the wasteful 
resources invested in the contest. This last result is not trivial. In such a situation, a 
government that wishes to decrease wasteful resources should encourage the 
formation of a consumers group governed by a central planner. This will not only 
increase the probability of winning, but will also decrease the wasteful recourses. 
On the other hand, we have shown that even in the case where the rent 
dissipation increases, we may find that the total expected payoffs will also increase. 
This result emphasizes the claim by Hurley (1998), which states that rent dissipation 
can be a misleading measure of the welfare implications of a contest, when players 
have asymmetric valuations. If, as commonly assumed in the recent political 
economic literature, Persson and Tabellini (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2001) and 
Epstein and Nitzan (2007), the government’s objective function is a weighted average 
of the expected social welfare and lobbying efforts (rent dissipation), the government 
would benefit from the challenge of becoming organized since both the expected 
payoffs and the rent dissipation increase.   22
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Appendix 1 - proof of proposition 2  
Part A1 
We will show that for  1  k , 
* * * RD RD   or in other words  0  G : 
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(a1) can be rewritten  
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When will  0  G  (
* * * RD RD  )? For this to hold, k must be sufficiently small and N 
has to be sufficiently large: for small values of k the values of the first three 
expressions in G are small (as they are multiplied by k): 
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and if N is sufficiently large the last expression in G 
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may dominate. 
For example if  003 . 0  k  , 7 . 0    and  000 , 20  N  then  0  G . 
 
Part B1 
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or after rearranging: 
       
     1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1
2 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 2
        
     
 
   
     
   
 
  
N kN k N N kN kN k N
N k N Nk N k N
    (a5) 
dividing both sides of (a5) by 
 2 1 k  we get: 










































































If  k is high enough (   k ) we get that the last inequality become: 
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We now show that this inequality is satisfied. First  0 ) 0 (    W  and 
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. Since for any N 
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 and  0 ) 0 (    W , therefore  0  W . We can conclude 
that for high values of k  we obtain         
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Part B2  
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Part C1: Expected payoffs of the defending group 
As a result of the challenging group becomes organized the expected payoffs of the 
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Part C2: Expected payoffs of the challenging group 
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Thus for low values of k (approaching zero) we obtain that (a8) is equivalent to 
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dividing both sides of (a9) by 
 2 k  we get: 
 


















































If  k is high enough (   k ) we get that the last inequality become: 
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identical to inequality (a6). Since for high values of k (k approaching infinity), we 
proved in part B1 that inequality (a6) is always satisfied therefore for high values of k 
we obtain        
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Appendix 2 - proof of proposition 3  
Part A1 
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Part B  
If  1  k  we found in 2.2.3 case 1 that         
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Part C1: Expected payoffs of the defending group 
If  1  k  we found in 2.2.3 case 1 that      0
* * *   d d U E U E . If  1  k  we found in 2.2.3 
cases 2 and 3 that     
* * *
d d U E U E  . Therefore in any case the expected payoffs of the 
defending group will not increase 
 
Part C2: Expected payoffs of the challenging group 
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